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That public policy affects organizational behaviors is well accepted, but less explored is
how these effects may depend on other external environmental factors. We investigated
policy as a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for understanding the growth of
commercial banking in the United States, 1896–1978. We highlight a trade-off for banks
between centralized and dispersed growth strategies and show that which strategy pre-
vails depends on how policy enabling branching interacts with technological, economic,
and cultural environments. Our findings contribute to understanding the contingent effects
of policy on organizations and on the growth of large corporations in the 20th century.
The effects of public policy on organizations and
economic activities have been widely observed. It
is now well accepted that policy changes funda-
mentally alter firms’ external environments and
mark transitions to new eras (e.g., Davis, Diek-
mann, & Tinsley, 1994; Dobbin & Dowd, 1997,
2000; Fligstein, 1990; Haveman, Russo, & Meyer,
2001; North, 1981; Russo, 2001). Tests of this view
typically center on how changes in policy result in
shifts in the types of economic activities that organ-
izations pursue. For instance, Fligstein (1990)
showed that laws prohibiting vertical mergers al-
tered firm acquisition activities, resulting in
changes in corporate structure and control. Roy
(1997) observed that changes in property laws en-
abled dispersed ownership and thus spurred the
corporate revolution by allowing firms to finance
large-scale manufacturing enterprises. And Dobbin
and Dowd, in their series of studies of the early
railroad industry in Massachusetts, showed that
changes in state and federal policies altered market
logics; as the authors put it, “Public policy estab-
lishes the ground rules of competition and thus
creates varieties of market behavior” (Dobbin &
Dowd, 1997: 501; Dobbin & Dowd, 2000). This line
of research has contributed to organizational theory
by showing the importance of state action for con-
structing not only economic systems but also the
structures and strategies of firms.
But there are a number of reasons why we think
this perspective may, in fact, overemphasize the
importance of public policy and that a contingent
perspective on the effects of policy may lead to
more refined organizational theory. It has long been
established that organizations are simultaneously
embedded in and affected by multiple environmen-
tal conditions (for a recent review, see Scott and
Davis [2007]). For example, several studies have
shown that the effect of one environmental condi-
tion on organizations is often contingent on other
environmental conditions. Bartley and Schneiberg
(2002) observed that the effect of interest groups on
the regulation of fire insurance rates varied de-
pending on the extent to which the fire insurance
field had become standardized. Mizruchi, Stearns,
and Marquis (2006) documented that the effects of
interfirm networks on firms’ use of debt varied over
time depending on the degree to which finance was
legitimized as an occupation. More relevant to our
focus, Haveman, Rao, and Paruchuri (2007) pro-
vided preliminary evidence that policy effects on
organizations may be sensitive to other environ-
mental features. Such effects were not their pri-
mary theoretical concern, yet their results showed
that laws authorizing bureaucracy in savings and
thrift associations did not stimulate the develop-
ment of such organizations until two additional
environmental factors emerged—news media and
role model organizations.
A more systematic perspective on the contingent
nature of policy can deepen understanding of the
fundamental nature of policy effects. Is whatever
power policy has entirely its own, or is it supported
or suppressed by other factors? The implication of
this question is both theoretically and practically far-
reaching. If policy effects are characterized by contin-
gency, previous studies that focus on the main effects
of policy may be misspecified, resulting in imprecise
or even incorrect conclusions. And in the realm of
practice, the degree to which policy effects are con-
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tingent would require policy makers to take other
enabling or constraining conditions into account
when stipulating and implementing policy.
In this study, we investigated the contingent na-
ture of policy, with the orienting premise that pol-
icy is just one of the environmental conditions that
organizations face and has more or less powerful
effects on organizations to the extent that it inter-
acts with other environmental conditions. Our em-
pirical investigation of this proposition focused on
U.S. commercial banking during the period from
1896 to 1978. Specifically, we examined how
branching policy, which stipulates whether banks
in a state can establish branch offices outside of
their headquarters location, affected banks’ pursuit
of two different types of growth strategy—central-
ized and dispersed—and how this policy interacted
with other environmental conditions. Banks purs-
ing a centralized strategy established fewer but
larger branches with narrower geographical cover-
age, and those pursuing a dispersed strategy estab-
lished a greater number of smaller branches with
wider geographic coverage. This setting was ideal
for our study because, until 1978, a bank’s retail
branch locations were limited to the state in which
it was headquartered and, as a result, there were 48
different banking systems within the contiguous
states. Banking policies and other environmental
conditions (i.e., technical, economic, and cultural)
varied considerably, not only over the course of the
20th century but also across the states, constituting
a natural laboratory in which to study the contin-
gent effects of policy on organizations. Having both
cross-sectional and longitudinal variance in envi-
ronmental conditions allowed us to overcome the
empirical limitations of prior studies, most of
which observed only longitudinal variation in en-
vironmental conditions by focusing on one state or
by considering the United States as a whole (e.g.,
Dobbin & Dowd, 1997, 2000; Fligstein, 1990; Roy,
1997); for exceptions, see Wade, Swaminathan, and
Saxon (1998) and Schneiberg and Bartley (2001).
Through investigation of bank growth in the 20th
century, we also contribute to understanding the
growth of large corporations in the United States. A
central and longstanding debate in this literature is
the extent to which the growth of large corporations
was a direct result of technical advances (Chandler,
1977) or of shifts in public policy (Fligstein, 1990;
Roe, 1994; Roy, 1997). More recently, research has
focused on cultural resistance to large-scale organ-
izations (Schneiberg, 2002; Schneiberg, King, &
Smith, 2008), particularly with respect to commer-
cial banking (Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007; Roe,
1994). But given the importance of contingent ex-
planations noted above, these studies, in giving
prominence to only one type of environmental con-
dition, probably offer only partial accounts of the
growth of large organizations. By considering pol-
icy, technical, economic, and cultural factors si-
multaneously and showing not only that they are
all important but also that their effects are contin-
gent upon one another, we provide a more nuanced
and comprehensive account of the growth of large
organizations in the United States.
Finally, our investigation of the growth of U.S.
banking organizations has a number of other impli-
cations. Banking organizations and their influence
on society have long been the focus of research and
public policy, dating back to the debates between
Jefferson and Hamilton (Brandeis, 1914; Calomiris,
1993; Davis & Mizruchi, 1999; Lounsbury, Hirsch,
& Klinkerman, 1998; Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007;
Mintz & Schwartz, 1985; Mizruchi, 1982, 1992).
Our investigation of the mechanisms and processes
underlying banking growth provides important in-
sights into where and how economic power has
consolidated in the United States. Furthermore, al-
though today thousands of dispersed retail outlets
can be seen in a variety of industries, such organi-
zations are only a recent phenomenon (Ingram &
Rao, 2004) and represent the ascendance of mod-
ernization in the organizational realm (Haveman &
Rao, 1997). By investigating the growth of multi-
unit organizations in banking, we contribute to an
understanding of how modernization processes
have unfolded in U.S. society.
ORGANIZATIONAL GROWTH IN 20TH
CENTURY U.S. BANKING
During the 20th century, the U.S. commercial
banking industry underwent a dramatic transfor-
mation in which single-unit, community-focused
firms were replaced by large, multibranch systems
typically headquartered in urban areas. At the turn
of the 20th century, for example, there were over
13,000 commercial banks in the United States, only
87 of which had any branches (and those 87 operated
a mere 112 branch locations). But a century later,
approximately 6,500 commercial banks operated
more than 80,000 branch locations. This change over
time presents an important theoretical and empirical
puzzle that we address here: What underlying mech-
anisms and processes led to this transition?
Bank Characteristics and Growth Strategies in
the Early 20th Century
As a first step to understanding how policy and
other environmental conditions might influence
bank growth, we highlight three characteristics of
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banking that are central to organizational growth:
the production-distribution link (simultaneity of
production and distribution), intraorganizational
coordination (pooled interdependence), and agency
relationships (characteristics of monitoring and
control systems). Our argument is that (1) as a re-
sult of these characteristics, banks during our study
period faced an important trade-off between cen-
tralized and dispersed growth strategies and (2)
their external environments influenced which
growth strategy they pursued.
Link between production and distribution. Cre-
ating a product and then delivering it into the
hands of consumers is perhaps the most fundamen-
tal act of a business organization. For industrial
firms of the type described by Chandler (1977),
production and distribution were two fundamen-
tally different activities. Production typically oc-
curred at a central venue, frequently a large factory,
as a way to maximize economies of scale. But for
service firms selling intangible products, such as
bank accounts, accounting services, hotel stays,
hospital procedures, and even air travel, no central
production site exists, and production and distri-
bution are not two separable processes (Upah,
1980; Zeithaml, Parasuraman, & Berry, 1985). For
these firms, Carmen and Langeard noted a “simul-
taneity of production and consumption” (1980: 1),
whereby the product does not exist until it is de-
livered into the hands of a customer. To the extent
that customers are often distributed over different
geographic locations, this simultaneity results in a
close connection between geography and the
growth of service firms such as banks. Thus, the
key to the growth of large banks is leveraging a
central office that can manage a large number of
dispersed locations.
Intraorganizational coordination. The link be-
tween production and distribution is likely to
affect the coordination of intraorganizational activi-
ties. Thompson (1967: 54) described three funda-
mental types of interdependence among intraorgan-
izational activities (examples of organizations
exhibiting each type of interdependence are in pa-
rentheses): pooled interdependence, whereby
“each part renders a discrete contribution to the
whole and each is supported by the whole”
(branches of an organization that do not have any
direct connection); sequential interdependence,
whereby X must act before Y can act (a subunit that
produces parts for an assembly line); and reciprocal
interdependence, whereby each unit’s outputs be-
come inputs to—and thus pose contingencies for—
the other units (an organization with both opera-
tions and maintenance functions). Nadler and
Tushman (1997) suggested that pooled interdepen-
dence is the most fundamental to understanding
the growth of service organizations, such as banks,
that serve consumers through geographically dis-
persed retail outlets. Because production of goods
for service firms is distributed among many outly-
ing locations, intraorganizational interdependence
takes the form of a hub-and-spoke network. There
is continual back-and-forth between the hub and
each spoke, both for agency reasons and to ensure
standardization of production (Langeard, Bateson,
Lovelock, & Engler, 1981), but there is little contact
between the spokes.
Agency relationships. Related to the above two
characteristics are the agency relationships be-
tween management and employees, particularly
the ways that employees are monitored and con-
trolled. For banks, as well as for other service firms
whose production occurs in a distributed fashion,
monitoring and controlling employees takes on dif-
ferent dimensions than it does for manufacturing
firms, whose large factories allow for close moni-
toring (Perrow, 2002). Since service products are
not tangible, “face-to-face visibility in the delivery
system, the personnel, the site, and the equipment
that create” (Carman & Langeard, 1980: 8) the prod-
ucts are essential components of those products. A
number of possible agency issues require monitor-
ing by an organization’s central office. For example,
significant risk of heterogeneously delivered ser-
vices exists (Zeithaml et al., 1985); that is, “many
different employees may be in contact with an in-
dividual consumer, raising a problem of consis-
tency of behavior” (Langeard et al., 1981: 16). Mak-
ing sure that outlying offices and personnel reflect
the wishes of the central office is therefore of par-
amount importance. This can be accomplished in
two ways, as documented in early treatises on bank
branching (Chapman & Westerfield, 1942). First,
employees can send reports, daily or otherwise, to
keep headquarters abreast of the activities of outly-
ing functions. Second, traveling agents from head-
quarters can visit and inspect outlying locations.
Both types of monitoring result in a transportation-
intensive information system for managing the
agency relationship. For organizations trying to ex-
pand, such a system imposes the trade-off dis-
cussed below.
Tension between centralized and dispersed
growth strategies. The bank characteristics dis-
cussed above created a set of growth challenges,
which resulted in a trade-off between centralized
and dispersed growth strategies, especially during
the historical period we examine. The simultaneity
of production and distribution determined that
banks’ growth was conditioned on their ability to
directly reach more customers. Before the advent of
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modern information technology, such as automated
teller machines (ATMs) and online banking, it was
essential to establish bank offices geographically
close to customers. Banks could pursue the central-
ized strategy of establishing a small number of
large-scale operations to deliver services in areas
with a higher concentration of customers (e.g., ur-
ban centers). But when such large offices reached
a saturation point, banks sought to establish
branches outside of centralized areas in order to
reach more customers in dispersed locations. Such
outlying branches were typically smaller because
dispersed customers did not support large bank
operations. Thus, banks that expand geographically
may be larger organizations in terms of aggregate
financial measures, but they may also be “spread
more thinly” as they focus on a greater number of
geographically dispersed areas.
The extent and size of a bank’s outlying branches
are also likely to be limited by its internal resource
constraints associated with coordination and agency
issues. During the time of the study, centralized
management at headquarters was considered a
“best practice” in branch administration. “Experi-
ence has proved,” it was observed at a conference
session of the American Institute of Banking in
1923, “that the best way to proceed in selling the
service of branch banks is to center everything in
connection with it at the main office” (American
Institute of Banking, 1923: 110). In addition, a pa-
per trail was legally required for all transactions
(Chapman & Westerfield, 1942), so coordinating
and monitoring branches was costly in that it relied
on extensive physical transportation of documents
and of monitoring personnel. Because of the diffi-
culty of monitoring, banks typically limited the
size of outlying locations for risk management pur-
poses (Chapman & Westerfield, 1942). As branches
grew in size, the dispersed local managers in-
creasingly controlled banks’ assets and reputa-
tions. To reduce this risk, banks preferred to es-
tablish a number of smaller branches as opposed
to a few larger ones.
Finally, the effects of the centralized/dispersed
trade-off were reinforced by the change in the role
of a bank’s headquarters location that took place
when the bank pursued a dispersed strategy. Geo-
graphic expansion beyond its headquarters loca-
tion is a profound strategic change for a firm (In-
gram & Baum, 1997). When a bank was pursuing a
centralized strategy, all attention was focused on
how to grow in one central area. But under the
dispersed strategy, the attention of the headquar-
ters shifted to centralized management of branches,
which reduced the focus on growth in that central
area, and thus the overall size of bank locations.
Below, we develop hypotheses to detail how this
trade-off between the centralized and dispersed
growth strategies is salient to understanding how
different features of external environments led to
different growth patterns of U.S. banks during the
early 20th century.
CONTINGENT EFFECTS OF POLICY ON U.S.
BANKING GROWTH
We developed a series of hypotheses addressing
how public policy, technological, economic, and
cultural features of banks’ environments and the
interactions between policy and the other features
influenced how, when, and where banks grew. As
noted above, bank growth during the historical pe-
riod we examined was characterized by a trade-off
between two strategies: the centralized strategy,
manifested in the large size of branches, and the
dispersed strategy, manifested in the wide geo-
graphical spread of branches. Our initial hypothe-
ses address how the public policy that allowed
branching affected the geographic dispersion and
location size of banks. We then considered how
other external environmental conditions (i.e., tech-
nological, economic, and cultural) moderated the
effects of branching policy on bank dispersion and
location size. Other environmental conditions
could only affect geographic dispersion if branch-
ing was legally allowed, but banks could increase
their local operations’ sizes regardless of the policy
governing branching. We therefore also considered
the main effects of technology, economic conditions,
and cultural environments on bank location size.
Public Policy and Organizational
Growth Strategies
For much of U.S. history, well into the 20th cen-
tury, the U.S. government heavily regulated major
industries, including banking, transportation, com-
munication, utilities, health care, and agriculture
(Wholey & Sanchez, 1991). Policy influences the
types of economic activity undertaken by directly
shaping the opportunity structure in markets. For
example, Dobbin and Dowd’s (1997) analysis indi-
cated that three public policies—public capitaliza-
tion, procartel, and antitrust—differentially af-
fected the founding of railroads by influencing
capital availability and competitive intensity in
Massachusetts from 1825 to 1922. Roy (1997) sug-
gested that property laws opened up the possibility
of large manufacturing corporations by making dis-
persed ownership possible. And Campbell and
Lindberg (1990) showed that when states changed
or threatened to change property laws, organiza-
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tions were stimulated to search for new forms of
organization, which brought about organizational
transformation.
In many service industries, such as banking,
growth leading to the large-scale organizations seen
today is frequently achieved by establishing geo-
graphically dispersed branches. However, the prac-
tice of establishing multiple business locations was
legally constrained for many service industries
throughout much of the 20th century. During the
1920s and 1930s, more than half of the states en-
acted anti-chain-store laws; such laws remained on
the books in 13 states as late as 1970 (Ingram & Rao,
2004). More recently, anti-chain-store policies have
been enacted by communities and municipalities,
most notably in California, to protect local busi-
nesses (Hampton, 2004). As a result, anti-chain-
store policies have greatly constrained service
firms from growing by establishing new branches.
Likewise, the banking industry was heavily regu-
lated at both the federal and state levels for much of
its history, and thus bank growth predicated on
establishing new branches was likely to be contin-
gent on the restrictiveness of state policy regulating
branching (Roe, 1994). Such policies varied signif-
icantly from state to state. Some state-level policies
permitted unit banking, whereby banks are permit-
ted to operate in only one location (thus precluding
branches); some permitted statewide banking,
whereby banks are permitted to operate branches
throughout a state; and some permitted limited
statewide banking, which permits only limited op-
eration of branches.1 Moreover, state policy regu-
lating bank branching underwent a transformation
during the 20th century, with the number of unit-
banking states declining and the number of branch-
banking states increasing dramatically (Calomiris,
1993). Thus, we anticipated that banks were likely
to exhibit variation in pursuing the dispersed
growth strategy, depending on the restrictiveness of
their state branching policies.
Hypothesis 1a. In states with less restrictive
branching policy, bank locations are likely to
be, on average, more geographically dispersed.
However, as discussed above, banks’ growth de-
cisions entail a fundamental trade-off. Banks that
are encouraged by more liberal branching policy to
adopt a dispersed strategy are likely to have smaller
individual locations. To restate briefly, this trade-
off is due to both external and internal constraints
on geographic growth. Before branching was legally
allowed in a particular state, banks could grow only
in that state by focusing on large operations in the
areas around their headquarters. When branching
was not legally restricted, banks were stimulated to
establish branches in dispersed areas to reach more
customers. For a number of reasons, these branches
were likely to be smaller. Dispersed population
centers were typically too small to support large
bank operations. There were also internal resource
constraints resulting from paper-based coordina-
tion and monitoring systems. Because of the diffi-
culty in monitoring, the headquarters typically
limited the size of outlying branches for risk man-
agement reasons. Finally, because the option of
pursuing a dispersed strategy made banks less de-
pendent on the centralized strategy to achieve
growth, the role of a bank’s headquarters changed
from serving customers to coordinating and moni-
toring the outlying branches, lessening the focus on
growing in the headquarters area.
Hypothesis 1b. In states with less restrictive
branching policy, banks are likely to have, on
average, smaller individual locations.
Technology Environments and Organizational
Growth Strategies
Policy that allows branching makes growth by
geographic expansion a feasible strategy for banks.
But geographic expansion creates coordination
and monitoring issues; banks’ headquarters need
to coordinate and monitor outlying branches in
dispersed locations (Nadler & Tushman, 1997;
Thompson, 1967). These coordination and moni-
toring issues lend importance to technology that
helps mitigate the difficulties created by geo-
graphic dispersion. During the early period of bank
growth, the development of transportation technol-
ogy helped stimulate banks to expand geographi-
cally, provided the policy in a state allowed
1 These are ideal types, the definitions of which may
vary slightly among states. Our categorizations are based
on various Federal Reserve Bulletins and on prior studies
of branching policy (Fischer, 1968; Welldon, 1910). Vari-
ation within these ideal types can touch on three main
areas, and in all instances our treatment of these differ-
ences follows prior work by the Federal Reserve. First, in
a few cases, particularly in unit-banking states early in
the 20th century, branching restrictions were a matter of
practice, enforced by state banking commissions rather
than explicit laws. Second, there was variation in how
restricted the branching was in limited-statewide-bank-
ing states. It was typically very proscribed—e.g., limited
to two offices or within a very restricted geographic area.
Further, a state could be classified as having statewide
banking when, in fact, banks could expand throughout
the state only by acquisition (Kroszner & Strahan, 1999),
not by establishing de novo branches.
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branching; expansion of the roadway infrastruc-
ture, in particular, helped bank headquarters coor-
dinate and inspect local branches.2 This view is
consistent with Greve’s (2000, 2002) spatial density
dependence model, which emphasized the impor-
tance of transportation infrastructure to the spread
of retail organizations such as banks during this
time period.
Bank headquarters coordinated and monitored
branches in two primary ways. First, large volumes
of bank documents were frequently transferred
from branches to headquarters. An early treatise on
the operation of bank branches by Chapman and
Westerfield (1942) described a range of paper sys-
tems for monitoring branch activities, including
duplicate records, daily reports, and the documen-
tation of personnel, financial statements, and gen-
eral business conditions. Early credit management
systems and procedures for branch banks described
extensive physical processes in place to manage
geographically dispersed credit (Whipple, 1935).
Headquarters’ reliance on paper systems was rein-
forced by legal regulations requiring a paper trail
for transactions, which necessitated the daily phys-
ical transport of extensive amounts of records
(Chapman & Westerfield, 1942).
Second, auditors from headquarters traveled to
inspect branches. A history of Comerica Bank re-
corded that “auditors, known as the ‘eyes and ears
of management,’ traveled to all locations to check
accounts and records” (Comerica, 1999: 19–20).
Otherwise, headquarters could not effectively coor-
dinate and monitor branches, as illustrated by the
early history of the First and Second Banks of the
United States. This firm was organized as a multi-
bank company, but its units were operated more as
independent subsidiaries than as branches of a cen-
tral organization because “in a time of slow com-
munication and transportation, it was impossible
for a head office to exercise day-to-day supervision
over a network of branches” (Robertson, 1968: 28).
Similarly, according to early historical descrip-
tions, the distances between the Bank of America’s
branches led it to operate more like a confederation
than a “well-knit, smoothly running, uniform or-
ganization” (James & James, 1954: 96). These his-
torical accounts suggest that outlying units posed
significant challenges to coordination and monitor-
ing that were met by advances in transportation
technology. This, in turn, suggests that when
branching is allowed, advanced transportation
technology is likely to induce banks to expand
geographically.
Hypothesis 2a. The positive effect of branching
policy on the dispersion of banks’ locations is
likely to be stronger, on average, in states with a
more advanced transportation infrastructure.
To the extent that a dispersed growth strategy
entails establishing smaller branches in areas of
sparser population than that of the urban centers, it
incurs higher coordination and monitoring costs.
These costs can be mitigated, however, by ad-
vanced transportation technology. All else being
equal, then, the more advanced a state’s transpor-
tation technology is, the more likely banks are to
pursue the dispersed growth strategy into more re-
mote areas, rather than a centralized strategy, and
the smaller their branches are likely to be.
Hypothesis 2b. The negative effect of branching
policy on the size of banks’ locations is likely to
be stronger, on average, in states with more ad-
vanced transportation infrastructure.
We suggest that, besides moderating the effects
of branching policy, transportation technology is
likely to affect the size of banks’ locations directly,
regardless of whether geographic expansion is al-
lowed. One effect of progress in transportation is to
diffuse a population geographically, as residents
are able to live farther from their places of work. As
a state’s population spreads out, its banking infra-
structure necessarily diffuses. If branching is not
allowed, there are opportunities to found small
banks to meet the needs of a geographically dis-
persed population. For example, in a study of early
bank locations, Southworth (1928: 118) found that,
as local travel options expanded following “the
advent of the automobile,” there was a push to
establish new banks in less-populated areas, lead-
ing, for example, to “small independent banks . . .
in Chicago [being] established.” Thus, whether or
not branching is allowed in a state, progress in that
state’s transportation technology is likely to de-
2 Other commonly studied technologies, such as the
telephone and the railroad, were not as essential in this
setting. Regarding the telephone, legal restrictions re-
quired a paper trail for bank transactions, so banks were
required to physically transport extensive transaction
records daily, even for transactions that technically
could be done by telephone (Chapman & Westerfield,
1942). Further, although rail transportation could help
address document transfer, the branches would need to
be along rail lines that connected them with bank head-
quarters, which was a significant constraint on bank
growth. Thus, according to bank manuals from this time,
roadways, which connected headquarters more directly
with outlying locations, were the most essential technol-
ogy for document and personnel transfer (Chapman &
Westerfield, 1942).
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crease the average size of bank locations in that
state.
Hypothesis 2c. In states with more advanced
transportation infrastructure, the size of indi-
vidual bank locations, on average, is likely to
be smaller.
Economic Environments and Organizational
Growth Strategies
Along with institutional and technology environ-
ments, economic environments affect organization-
al growth. For example, general economic condi-
tions (e.g., income per capita) need to be developed
enough to create sufficient market demand (Nohria,
Dyer, & Daltzell, 2002). But we suggest that two
other economic conditions, urbanization and de-
gree of business competition, are of particular im-
portance for understanding why banks grow in ei-
ther a centralized or a dispersed fashion.
Urbanization. Since services such as banking are
greatly contingent on how customers are distrib-
uted geographically, urbanization—the degree to
which a state’s population is concentrated in cit-
ies—is likely to influence their growth strategies.
Histories of a number of banks suggest that the
urbanization that occurred during the 20th century
was a prime driver in banks’ growth (Collis, 1926;
Fischer, 1968; Klebaner, 1990). Urbanization, like
the transportation technology discussed above,
cannot affect banks’ geographic dispersion in a par-
ticular state unless branching is allowed in that
state. But when branching is allowed, urbanization
should suppress the effect of branching policy in
stimulating a dispersed strategy, since geographic
expansion is less attractive as a growth strategy
when customers and businesses are more concen-
trated in cities. As a result, banks in states with
greater urbanization are likely to be less dispersed
geographically but to have larger locations. In con-
trast, banks in states with less urbanization would
likely pursue a dispersed strategy and establish a
larger number of smaller branches. Thus, we sug-
gest that a state’s urbanization moderates the effects
of that state’s branching policy on bank dispersion
and location size.
Hypothesis 3a. The positive effect of branching
policy on banks’ geographic dispersion is
likely to be weaker, on average, in states with
higher urbanization.
Hypothesis 3b. The negative effect of branch-
ing policy on the size of individual banking
locations is likely to be weaker, on average, in
states with higher urbanization.
In line with the historical studies mentioned
above, we also suggest that urbanization is likely to
increase the size of individual bank locations,
whether or not branching is allowed (Collis, 1926;
Fischer, 1968; Klebaner, 1990). Examples of how
banks grew as cities expanded abound. A history of
NationsBank tied the growth of the company to the
growth of urban areas (Covington & Ellis, 1993), a
link made more explicit in a history of Detroit-
based Comerica Bank, which recounts that the
firm’s services were limited when the city was
sparsely settled, but as Detroit grew, so did the
bank (Comerica, 1999). Collis’s (1926) early de-
scription of branch banking suggested that the
growth of cities directly led to bank growth. The
foregoing discussion suggested that urbanization
directly affects bank growth patterns. The greater
the urbanization and, hence, the more concen-
trated the population in a state, the more likely
banks are to pursue a centralized as opposed to a
dispersed strategy, which will be reflected in
greater location size.
Hypothesis 3c. In states with greater urban
populations, banks are likely to have, on aver-
age, larger individual banking locations.
Business competition. Another important eco-
nomic factor likely to influence banking growth is
the degree of competition among banks in a state. In
general, competition among firms has been shown
to reduce profit margins (e.g., Porter, 1980) and
threaten organizational survival (e.g., Carroll &
Hannan, 2000). For example, Baum and Mezias
(1992) showed how hotels in environments where
there were greater numbers of similar, competing
hotels experienced higher mortality. When firms
compete intensely by pursuing the same strategy,
that strategy is less likely to bring competitive ad-
vantage, therefore becoming less attractive (Barney,
1986; Peteraf, 1993). In accordance with the above
rationale, we contend that business competition
suppresses banks’ pursuit of either growth strategy,
dispersed or centralized.
When branching policy allows geographic ex-
pansion, banks are likely to pursue the dispersed
strategy in order to grow. However, if competition
in pursuing the dispersed strategy is intense, banks
are likely to be discouraged from expanding geo-
graphically because competition tends to lower the
return from dispersion. Therefore, in states with
higher competition among banks, branching policy
is less likely to stimulate geographic expansion and
banks are therefore less likely to be geographically
dispersed. Similarly, Haveman and Nonnemaker
(2000) showed that entry and growth of savings and
loans in California was directly related to geographic
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market size. Higher competition among firms in the
same market effectively shrinks the market size, re-
ducing firms’ tendency to enter and grow.
Moreover, the dispersed strategy, if its value is
dampened by high competition, is less likely to
constitute an attractive alternative to the central-
ized strategy, so banks may instead pursue the cen-
tralized strategy even if branching is allowed. The
net result is that the effects of branching policy on
the geographic dispersion and the size of individ-
ual bank locations, as captured by Hypotheses 1a
and 1b, are weaker when competition among banks
is more intense.
Hypothesis 4a. The positive effect of branching
policy on banks’ geographic dispersion is
likely to be weaker, on average, in states with
more intense competition among banks.
Hypothesis 4b. The negative effect of branch-
ing policy on the size of individual banking
locations is likely to be weaker, on average, in
states with more intense competition among
banks.
Finally, competition among banks will likely
decrease the size of bank locations, regardless of
whether branching is allowed in a state. When
branching is not allowed in a state, banks pursue
the centralized strategy primarily in the urban
centers where they are headquartered. To the ex-
tent that the sizes of such markets are largely
fixed within a given time period, increasing com-
petition among banks simply means that the rel-
ative sizes of the markets and profit margins de-
crease so that it becomes less attractive for banks
to expand their operation in those markets (Have-
man & Nonnemaker, 2000; Porter, 1980). When
branching is allowed in a state, banks can also
pursue the dispersed strategy. But to the extent
that population in areas outside of urban centers
is sparser, bank locations are likely to be smaller
there than in urban centers. Moreover, intense
competition means that banks are likely to com-
pete with each other in these markets as well.
This intense competition may force banks to
scale back the sizes of their locations, because
their profit margins are relatively low. Under all
of these circumstances, then, intense competition
reduces the size of bank locations.
Hypothesis 4c. In states with more intense
competition among banks, the size of individ-
ual bank locations, on average, is likely to be
smaller.
Cultural Environments and Organizational
Growth Strategies
A long-standing tradition in organizational the-
ory has focused on how cultural factors influence
organizational strategies and forms (e.g., Dobbin,
1994; Haveman & Rao, 1997; Haveman et al., 2007;
Ingram & Simons, 2000; Lounsbury, 2007). Impor-
tant for our study of banking is how U.S. bank
growth was affected by a deep-seated general mis-
trust of centralized power, particularly with regard
to large banks. Tocqueville (1835/2000), for exam-
ple, during his extended trip to the United States in
1831 and 1832, focused on how local organizations
developed as an antidote to centralized state and
economic powers, an important tension surfaced
by other influential sociological analyses (e.g., Lip-
set, 1963; Mills, 1956). Along the same lines, Mar-
quis and Lounsbury (2007) recently showed that
community-based resistance to centralized banking
power is still an important cultural logic that influ-
ences industry dynamics.
During the time period of our study, local agrar-
ianism was a particularly important cultural logic
that promoted community-oriented banking (Roe,
1994). In many cases, this effect stemmed from
farmers’ interest in having a close banking relation-
ship. For example, Roe (1994) described how farm-
ers and small-town residents fervently supported
local banking because locally focused banks would
presumably continue supplying credit during eco-
nomic downturns. Calomiris (1993) similarly doc-
umented that farmers have valued local banking
throughout U.S. history up to the present and that
this cultural support was essential to maintaining a
decentralized banking system. Recent analyses of
bank lending to small farms have also suggested
that the tight ties between farmers and local banks
are persistent considerations for understanding the
structure of the U.S. banking industry and the sizes
of local banks (Akhavein, Goldberg, & White, 2004).
More generally, others have found that agrarian
resistance to centralized power provided an alter-
native logic as modernization proceeded and have
noted specifically how smaller-scale mutual firms
developed in insurance and other industries as al-
ternatives to large organizations (Schneiberg, 2002;
Schneiberg et al., 2008).
Following these previous studies, we suggest that
the presence of actors with an agrarian logic in a
state is likely to have two implications for bank
growth in that state. First, when the relaxation of
state branching policy encourages banks to expand
geographically, these actors are likely to resist
banks’ geographical expansion and thus moderate
the effects of the state’s branching policy. Banks
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that do expand into different geographical areas are
likely to be perceived as powerful corporations
lacking a local orientation and strong concern for
local interests (Wright, 2001). Actors representing
the agrarian logic are therefore likely to resist
banks’ geographical expansion. Such actors might,
for example, patronize local banks instead of banks
focused on branching and publicly voice their neg-
ative opinion about the latter (see also Carroll and
Swaminathan [2000] and Marquis and Lounsbury
[2007] for accounts of similar types of resistance).
Although organized collective action is critical for
enacting antibranching policy, as in the case of anti-
chain laws (Ingram & Rao, 2004), ongoing, less-orga-
nized resistance is important for preventing banks
from expanding geographically when branching is
legally allowed. Such resistance might render geo-
graphic expansion less attractive as a growth strategy
for banks, especially when the resistance is strong.
Consequently, the effects of policy that allows banks
to pursue geographic expansion posited in Hypothe-
ses 1a and 1b are likely to be reduced in states with a
greater agrarian presence.
Hypothesis 5a. The positive effect of branching
policy on the geographic dispersion of banks’
locations is likely to be weaker, on average, in
states with a greater agrarian presence.
Hypothesis 5b. The negative effect of branch-
ing policy on the size of banks’ locations is
likely to be weaker, on average, in states with a
greater agrarian presence.
Second, in line with recent studies of bank lend-
ing to small farms (Akhavein, Goldberg, & White,
2004), a greater agrarian presence in a state is likely
to keep banks locally oriented, which causes them
to grow by increasing the size of local operations,
regardless of whether or not branching is allowed.
When branching is not allowed in a state, actors
with an agrarian logic provide support for commu-
nity-oriented institutions, a favorable condition for
banks increasing their local operations (Marquis &
Lounsbury, 2007). When branching is allowed in a
state, actors with an agrarian logic are likely to
resist banks’ geographic expansion, as pointed out
above. Banks are then likely to resort to the alter-
native strategy outlined above—growing the size of
their individual locations.
Hypothesis 5c. In states with a greater agrarian
presence, banks are likely to have, on average,
larger individual locations.
Table 1 summarizes our hypotheses. As a whole,
they elaborate the core argument that, although
branching policy is a baseline condition, different
transportation infrastructures, economic conditions,
and cultural environments—as well as their inter-
actions with branching policy—in different states
affected banks’ pursuit of the dispersed or the cen-
tralized growth strategy.
METHODS AND ANALYSIS
To test our predictions, we examined annual
state-level banking organization for all the contig-
uous U.S. states from 1896 through 1978. The turn
of the 20th century was the ideal starting point for
this analysis because there were virtually no mul-
tiunit banks in the country at that time and expan-
sion was just becoming a debated topic (Calomiris,
1993). Moreover, a reliable series of state-level data
became available in 1896. (All data on state bank-
ing characteristics are from Flood [1998] and Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Corporation [FDIC] annual
publications [http://www2.fdic.gov/hsob/index.
asp].) We ended our study in 1978 because this was
the year that banks began interstate branching. Fol-
lowing Schneiberg and Bartley (2001), we per-
formed state-year analyses to determine average
bank growth for each state. To address the issue of
simultaneity, we lagged our independent variables
by one year, so our analyses were based on 3,893
TABLE 1
Summary of Hypotheses and Empirical Support
Theorized Variables
Geographic
Dispersion
Empirical
Support
Location
Size
Empirical
Support
Branching policy H1a () Yes H1b () No
Transportation infrastructure H2c () Yes
Transportation infrastructure  branching policy H2a () Yes H2b () Yes
Urbanization H3c () Yes
Urbanization  branching policy H3a () No H3b () No
Business competition H4c () Yes
Business competition  branching policy H4a () Yes H4b () Yes
Agrarian presence H5c () Yes
Agrarian presence  branching policy H5a () Yes H5b () Yes
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state-year observations (83 observations for every
state except Oklahoma, which became a state in
1907, and New Mexico and Arizona, which became
states in 1912).
Bank-level data might have produced a finer-
grained test because we would have been able to
observe individual banks’ strategies, but such data
are not available for this early and extended histor-
ical period. We believe, however, that examining
our hypotheses at the state level is valid, since our
focus was comparing differences in banks’ external
environments (policy, technological, economic,
and cultural) across rather than within states to see
whether, on average, banks in one state were sig-
nificantly larger and more dispersed than those in
another. Further, our finer-grained, qualitative data
on the history of certain individual banks and bank
associations also support our underlying theory.
Dependent Variables
Our empirical strategy for testing our arguments
was to examine whether the different policy, tech-
nological, economic, and cultural conditions in
each state created cross-state variation in bank
growth along two dimensions: bank geographic dis-
persion and bank location size. Bank geographic
dispersion, which captures growth achieved by the
dispersed strategy, was measured as the percentage
of bank locations in a given state that were outside
of a bank’s headquarters location. This is a direct
measure of the extent to which banks relied on
outlying locations. These data were from various
years of the Federal Reserve Bulletin, which annu-
ally publishes counts of branches at the state level,
indicating whether or not branches are in banks’
head-office cities.3 Bank location size was meant to
capture bank growth achieved by the centralized
strategy, whereby banks establish large branches
without necessarily expanding geographically. The
typical measure of a bank’s size—its overall finan-
cial assets—reflects the results of both the dis-
persed and centralized growth strategies. In order
to estimate whether states had banks with greater or
lesser degrees of focus on large locations, we took
the total banking assets in each state for each year
from 1896 through 1978 and divided it by the total
number of banking locations for that year, includ-
ing both the headquarters and the branches.
Independent Variables
Branching policy. Because state restrictions on
branching varied considerably, we created annual
state-level legal-environment histories for all 48
states in the sample from 1896 to 2001. To con-
struct these regulatory histories of state branching
policy, we examined more than 15 secondary
sources and, in many cases, the actual statutes; see
the Appendix for more detail. As noted above, laws
sanction three primary types of branching: unit
banking, where there is no branching allowed;
statewide branching, where banks can branch
throughout the state; and limited statewide branch-
ing, where banks can branch within a circum-
scribed area. As we describe above in footnote 2,
the definitions of these types vary somewhat state-
to-state; in coding the states’ branching policies, we
relied on precedent set by the Federal Reserve Bul-
letin and previous research (Fisher, 1968; Kroszner
& Strahan, 1999; Welldon, 1910). To capture the
variation in regulation, we created a dummy vari-
able coded 1 to indicate a state that allowed state-
wide branching and 0 otherwise.4
Technological infrastructure. Because our trans-
portation hypotheses focus on expansion beyond
centralized population areas, we obtained data on
states’ nonurban (i.e., rural) roadway mileage from
various issues of Highway Statistics, an annual
3 Because the Federal Reserve published these and
historical counts only sporadically before 1929, a small
amount of data for missing years between 1896 and 1929
are linearly interpolated. Comprehensive data exist for
1896–1910, 1924, and 1929, and by examining other
publications, such as state statutes, which were pub-
lished by the Federal Reserve in 1925, we were able to
identify some but not all changes between 1910 and
1924. Because (1) this early period was mostly character-
ized by small numbers of outlying branch locations and
(2) these values appear to be stable, interpolating these
few values should not be an issue. We also performed a
number of robustness checks on our results to verify that
the interpolated variables did not have any undue influ-
ence on the results, and we are very confident that this is
the case. For example, analyses without the interpolated
values show even stronger effects for variables of interest
than the presented models do. Additional analyses with-
out observations before 1929 also returned results quite
similar to those reported.
4 Separate analyses were also run with variables indicat-
ing whether or not a state allowed any branching (i.e., 1 
“statewide and limited statewide”). These results were
quite similar, although some effects were less statistically
significant than the reported results. We felt, however, that
the current operationalization was the best because, in most
cases, limited statewide branching was highly circum-
scribed (e.g., branches could only be within sight of the
headquarters). Thus our arguments about coordination and
agency relationships are more appropriately tested in states
where branching capabilities were more expansive.
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publication of the U.S. Department of Transporta-
tion. These data became available at the state level
in 1923; we extrapolated the series back to 1896.5
Because the outlying highway system did not grow
significantly until after 1923, the extrapolation of
these values should not bias the analyses; the re-
sults are consistent when the extrapolated data are
excluded. Although many different technology sys-
tems might be important for the coordination needs
of banks (e.g., railroads, telephones, and telegraph),
we emphasize the development of roadways be-
cause, as discussed above, during our study period
banks relied primarily on road transportation to
monitor outlying branches and to transfer paper
documents and money between branches and
headquarters.
Economic conditions. As discussed above, we
focused on two economic conditions that influ-
enced bank growth. Urbanization was measured as
the percentage of the state’s population living in
urban areas. We collected population data from the
U.S. Census Bureau at ten-year intervals beginning
in 1900, the intervening years being interpolated.6
Following Carroll and Hannan (2000), we mea-
sured business competition as the number of banks
in a given state (log-transformed to correct a
skewed distribution).7 This measure of business
competition was consistent with our theorizing and
historical studies of competition in U.S. commer-
cial banking (Wright, 2001).
Cultural resistance. As discussed above, our
theorizing mainly concerned ongoing resistance by
actors with an agrarian logic. Accordingly, the
greater the number of such actors, the stronger the
likely resistance against banks’ geographical expan-
sion. To capture the influence of cultural resis-
tance, we included a variable, agrarian presence,
that measured the number of farms in a given state
(log-transformed to correct a skewed distribution).
The data for this measure were collected from the
U.S. Department of Agriculture’s historical data-
base on farms.
Control Variables
We included in our analysis a number of controls
to account for possible alternative explanations and
confounding processes. Per capita income, a mea-
sure of wealth, was collected for each state from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis and, prior to 1929,
from Population Redistribution and Economic
Growth, 1870–1950 (Lee et al., 1957). Controlling
for per capita income can address two particular
issues. First, to the extent that per capita income
reflects economic fluctuations in the U.S. economy,
a control variable for it should be a proxy for the
demand for banking services. Second, recall that
urbanization, which reflects the geographic con-
centration of population in a state, is important for
understanding bank growth in the early 20th cen-
tury. To the extent that urbanization often corre-
lates with per capita income, as it does in this study
(r .69), controlling for per capita income can help
tease out the effect of population concentration
from general economic conditions.
During our period of study, some major changes
in federal regulations might have had an impact on
the growth of the commercial banking industry
(Calomiris, 1993). Therefore, we used dummy vari-
ables to divide our period of study into (1) the
period prior to the Federal Reserve Act (pre-Federal
Reserve, 1896–1913), (2) the period after the Glass-
Steagall Act (post-Depression, 1934–1978), and (3)
the period between these two acts (1914–1933),
which serves as the reference category. As another
way to account for the temporal dimension of our
study, we included a linear time trend variable to
account for the fact that some of our key variables,
such as transportation and urbanization, were
growing over time (see Dobbin and Dowd [1997] for
a similar strategy of using period variables with a
time trend).
We also controlled for other factors that may
have had an important influence on bank growth.
5 To accomplish this, we used the percent change in
total annual national highway mileage (for which there
are data back to 1900) to guide our determination of how
much rural mileage increased each year. By 1900, the end
of this data series, total national mileage was reduced to
100. To get the 1896 to 1899 values, we linearly interpo-
lated for each state under the assumption that in 1896
there were 0 miles of national highway.
6 Prior to 1950, the U.S. Census Bureau defined urban
area as all territory, persons, and housing units in incorpo-
rated places of 2,500 or more persons. After 1950, the U.S.
Census Bureau’s definition of urban area changed slightly
to territory, persons, and housing units in urbanized areas
and, outside urbanized areas, in all places, incorporated or
unincorporated, that had 2,500 or more persons. This def-
inition has remained substantially unchanged ever since.
To check whether the 1950 change affected our results, we
included a period dummy with 1 indicating years after
1950; the results (available from the authors upon request)
were not materially different from the reported results.
7 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out
that competition is likely to be localized in banking and
thus our state-level measure may not accurately tap com-
petition for banks. In supplementary analyses, we found
that urbanization was a statistically significant modera-
tor of competition, reinforcing a negative effect on dis-
persion, suggesting that competition was at least partially
localized.
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Percent manufacturing, measured as the percent-
age of manufacturing employment in a state, cap-
tures the variation among states of an important
economic constituency that relies on banking ser-
vices, has an interest in banking growth, and has
been shown to be an important lobby for banking
law changes (Abrams & Settle, 1993). These data
were collected from Historical Statistics of the
States of the United States (Dodd, 1993) and the
U.S. Census Bureau. State population (data from
the U.S. Census Bureau) was also included to ac-
count for state size. Square miles measured the size
of a state as a way to take into account that a state’s
highway mileage is to some extent a function of its
size, that size may also influence the number of
farms, and that size can also directly influence
bank dispersion. To control for the alternative
growth strategy available to banks, we included the
lagged average bank size and the number of
branches in the given state in our analyses of bank
geographic dispersion. In the analyses of bank
location size, we included bank geographic
dispersion.
Statistical Models
Primary considerations in deciding the appropri-
ate model for our analyses included (1) multiple
observations for each state and (2) a high degree of
autocorrelation between a given year and the pre-
vious year. Given this time series panel structure,
we used Prais-Winston regression with a panel-
specific autoregressive disturbance structure (the
“xtpcse” command in STATA, with autocorrela-
tion  “psar 1”). In such situations, Beck (2001)
recommended a model with panel-corrected stan-
dard errors. Durbin-Watson tests confirmed the ex-
istence of autocorrelation in our panels. The Prais-
Winston estimator is a generalized least squares
(GLS) estimator corrected for first-order serially
correlated residuals specific to each panel (i.e.,
within states as opposed to across the entire data
set, as is customary with time series analyses).
One possible concern with our analyses and re-
sults is endogeneity; an independent variable in-
cluded in the regression model may be a choice
rather than a random variable, correlating with un-
observable factors in the error term. Usually, endo-
geneity can be addressed either by explicitly con-
trolling for those unobservable factors in the
analyses or by estimating a two-stage model
(Greene, 2008; Millimet, 2001). In this context, the
enactment of branching policy in a state could be
endogenous and due to some unobservable factors
that might systematically bias the effects of our
independent variables on our dependent variables.
For example, a strong agrarian presence in a state
could suppress both the passage of branching pol-
icy and banks’ geographic expansion. If we did not
control for this factor, the estimated effect of
branching policy on banks’ geographic dispersion
would have been biased. Similarly, other factors,
such as business competition among banks, trans-
portation technology, urbanization, and per capita
income could all affect both the passage of branch-
ing policy and our dependent variables. Since we
could largely identify these major factors, includ-
ing them in our analyses lessened endogeneity con-
cerns. Confirming this observation, the estimated
results were very similar when we used two-stage
instrumental variable models (the “xtivreg” com-
mand in STATA), with branching policy and its
interactions designated as endogenous (or instru-
mented) variables and the degree of progressive
laws in a state as our instrumental variable (an
index of progressive laws, based on Fishback and
Kantor’s [2000] database). This instrument was se-
lected because the degree of progressivism in a
state influences how corporations and the state in-
teract (Haveman et al., 2007; Schneiberg, 2002) and
is likely related to the likelihood of adopting
branching laws, yet not specifically related to our
dependent variables, which tap organizational
growth strategies. These results are available upon
request.
RESULTS
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics and the
correlation matrix. Tables 3 and 4 present the re-
sults of regression equations for the analyses of
bank geographic dispersion and bank location size.
For ease of comparison, the models are presented
in the same sequence.
Bank Geographic Dispersion Analyses
Table 3 indicates whether environmental condi-
tions account for cross-state variation in banks’ geo-
graphic dispersion, indicating whether banks in
different states with different environmental con-
ditions were likely to pursue the dispersed growth
strategy. Model 1 is the baseline model, with all
control variables. Models 2 and 3 test Hypothesis
1a. The difference between these two models is
whether agrarian presence, transportation technol-
ogy, urbanization, and business competition are
included. Regardless, the estimated coefficients for
branching policy in both models are statistically
significant with a positive sign, supporting Hypoth-
esis 1a and suggesting that banks in states with
more liberal branching policies were on average
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more likely than banks in states with more restric-
tive branching policies to establish geographically
distant branches—that is, pursue the dispersed
strategy.
Model 4 tests Hypothesis 2a. The estimated co-
efficient of the interaction between branching pol-
icy and transportation infrastructure is statistically
significant with the predicted positive direction,
supporting Hypothesis 2a. To assess the moderat-
ing effect of transportation infrastructure, we used
the estimated equation (0.05  branching policy 
0.04  branching policy  transportation infra-
structure). All else being equal, when transporta-
tion infrastructure takes a low value of 0.20 (the
mean), the passage of statewide branching policy
decreases average bank geographic dispersion in
that state by about 13 percent. When transportation
infrastructure takes the high value of 0.52 (1 s.d.
above the mean), the passage of statewide branch-
ing policy increases average bank geographic dis-
persion in that state by about 18 percent.
The effects of two economic conditions—urban-
ization and business competition—on bank geo-
graphic dispersion are tested in models 5 and 6,
respectively. Model 5 addresses Hypothesis 3a,
which predicts that the effect of branching policy
on average bank geographic dispersion is weaker in
states with higher urbanization. The estimated co-
efficient for the interaction between branching pol-
icy and urbanization is statistically significant, but
the sign is the opposite of our prediction, failing to
support Hypothesis 3a.8 Model 6 tests Hypothesis
4a, which predicts that the effect of branching pol-
icy on average bank geographic dispersion is
weaker in states with more intense business com-
petition among banks. The interaction term be-
tween branching policy and business competition
is negative and significant as predicted, supporting
Hypothesis 4a.
Model 7 tests Hypothesis 5a, which predicts that
the effect of branching policy on average bank geo-
graphic dispersion is weaker in a state with a stron-
ger agrarian presence. The estimated coefficient for
the interaction between branching policy and
agrarian presence is statistically significant with
the predicted negative sign, supporting Hypothesis
5a. Model 8 is a full model with all of the variables.
Bank Location Size Analyses
Table 4 presents the results of analyses testing
whether environmental conditions in a state affect
8 The history of the commercial banking industry sug-
gests one possible explanation for this unexpected result.
As noted, before branching was allowed, establishing
large operations in urban centers was the only way for
banks to grow in most states (Fischer, 1968). As a result,
competition among banks in urban centers was intense
and, when branching was allowed, banks might therefore
have been driven to expand geographically. This ten-
dency might have been stronger for banks located in
bigger urban centers where competition was more
intense.
TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix
Variables Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
1. Bank geographic
dispersion
0.15 0.21
2. Bank location size 7.84 1.36 .50
3. Branching policy 0.31 0.46 .56 .07
4. Agrarian presence 11.11 1.24 .42 .28 .32
5. Transportation
infrastructure
2.23 0.83 .46 .82 .01 .03
6. Urbanization 0.50 0.21 .36 .79 .03 .32 .55
7. Business competition 5.44 1.15 .55 .16 .51 .81 .05 .01
8. Agrarian presence 
branching policy
3.22 4.91 .51 .02 .99 .21 .003 .02 .42
9. Transportation
infrastructure 
branching policy
0.69 1.12 .72 .22 .92 .33 .21 .15 .50 .90
10. Urbanization 
branching policy
0.16 0.26 .68 .25 .89 .45 .14 .30 .55 .83 .91
11. Business competition 
branching policy
1.40 2.20 .42 .004 .96 .15 .01 .03 .33 .99 .87 .80
12. State population 14.35 1.08 .06 .38 .21 .63 .47 .44 .68 .15 .11 .14 .10
13. Per capita income 0.96 0.51 .58 .82 .11 .42 .65 .69 .19 .06 .26 .31 .03 .23
14. Percent manufacturing 0.07 0.05 .15 .40 .05 .19 .17 .64 .06 .03 .09 .17 .04 .29 .29
15. Average bank size 1.45 1.37 .72 .92 .25 .39 .69 .81 .32 .19 .41 .47 .14 .35 .81 .44
16. Square miles 6.46 4.72 .06 .07 .08 .18 .04 .10 .09 .06 .06 .06 .07 .02 .02 .52 .09
17. Time trend 41.87 23.53 .58 .86 .08 .22 .92 .51 .18 .04 .27 .21 .01 .28 .78 .09 .76 .01
18. Post-Depression 0.54 0.50 .50 .77 .11 .16 .75 .43 .23 .08 .26 .21 .04 .23 .61 .05 .69 .01 .86
19. Pre–Federal Reserve 0.22 0.42 .33 .61 .03 .09 .83 .35 .05 .01 .20 .13 .01 .20 .37 .07 .46 .02 .72 .58
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average bank location size, indicating whether
banks in different states with different environmen-
tal conditions were likely to pursue the centralized
growth strategy. Model 9 is the baseline model.
Models 10 through 15 test the main effects of
branching policy, transportation technology, ur-
banization, business competition, and agrarian
presence, as predicted by Hypotheses 1b, 2c, 3c, 4c,
and 5c, respectively. Models 16 through 19 test
whether transportation technology, urbanization,
business competition, and agrarian presence mod-
erate the effects of branching policy on average
bank location size, as predicted by Hypotheses 2b,
3b, 4b, and 5b, respectively.
Model 10 tests Hypothesis 1b, which predicts that
banks in a state with less restrictive branching policy
are more likely on average to have smaller bank loca-
tions. The estimated coefficient for branching policy
is positive and nonsignificant, suggesting no clear
relationship between branching policy and average
bank location size in a state. However, models 18 and
19 show that when the predicted interaction variables
are included, the estimated coefficients for branching
policy become negative and at least marginally sig-
nificant, as is consistent with our prediction. This
finding, although not completely in line with our
original prediction, nonetheless provides support for
our broader thesis that one cannot consider the main
effect of a policy independently of the other environ-
mental conditions with which that policy interacts.
Model 11 tests Hypothesis 2c and provides sup-
port for the prediction that banks in states with
greater transportation infrastructure are less likely
on average to have larger locations. In model 12, the
estimated coefficient for urbanization is positive
and significant as predicted, supporting Hypoth-
esis 3c. The result shows that banks in states with
higher urbanization are more likely on average to
have larger locations. Model 13 tests Hypothesis
4c, which predicts that banks in states with more
intense interbank competition are less likely on
average to have larger locations. The estimated
coefficient for business competition is negative
and significant as predicted, supporting Hypoth-
esis 4c. Model 14 tests Hypothesis 5c, which
predicts that banks are more likely on average to
have larger locations in states with a stronger
agrarian presence. Although the estimated coef-
ficient for agrarian presence is not significant in
model 14, it is positive and significant as pre-
dicted in model 15, the model with all the hy-
pothesized main effects, supporting Hypothesis
5c. This finding suggests that when two states
have the same levels of transportation technol-
ogy, urbanization, and business competition,
agrarian presence becomes an important factor
leading banks to have larger locations.
Model 16 tests Hypothesis 2b, which predicts
that the effect of branching policy on bank location
size is stronger in a state with a more advanced
transportation infrastructure. The estimated coeffi-
cient for the interaction between branching policy
and transportation technology is negative and sig-
nificant (p  .06, two-tailed test), providing mar-
ginal support to Hypothesis 2b. Model 16 shows
that the effect of branching policy on average bank
location size depends on the condition of a state’s
transportation infrastructure. Figure 1 illustrates
this relationship.
Model 17 tests Hypothesis 3b, which predicts
that the negative effect of branching policy on av-
erage bank location size is weaker in a state with
higher urbanization. The estimated coefficient for
the interaction between branching policy and ur-
banization is not significant; the analysis does not
support Hypothesis 3b.
Model 18 tests Hypothesis 4b, which predicts
that the negative effect of branching policy on bank
average location size is weaker in a state with
stronger business competition among banks. The
estimated coefficient for the interaction between
branching policy and average business competi-
tion is positive and significant as predicted, sup-
porting Hypothesis 4b. Although the main effect
of branching policy is not significant in models
10 and 15, when the interaction between branch-
ing policy and agrarian presence is entered in
model 18, the main effect of branching policy
becomes marginally significant and negative as
predicted. Figure 2 illustrates the moderating ef-
fect of business competition.
Model 19 tests Hypothesis 5b, which predicts
that the negative effect of branching policy on av-
erage bank location size is weaker in a state with a
stronger agrarian presence. The estimated coeffi-
cient for the interaction between branching policy
and agrarian presence is positive and significant as
predicted, supporting Hypothesis 5b. Recall that in
models 10 and 15, the main effect of branching
policy was not statistically significant. However,
when the interaction between branching policy and
agrarian presence was entered in model 19, the
main effect of branching policy became significant
and negative as predicted. Figure 3 illustrates the
moderating effect of agrarian presence.
To summarize, the two sets of analyses presented
above corroborate each other to lend strong support
to our arguments. First, there appeared to be a
trade-off between two distinct growth strategies for
banks during our study period: the environmental
conditions we theorize about exhibit uniformly op-
2009 1237Marquis and Huang
posite effects on bank geographical dispersion and
bank location size, which capture the dispersed
and the centralized growth strategy, respectively.
Second, the environmental conditions that shape
the strategy pursued by banks in a given state, and
the effects of policy on banks’ growth strategy, are
highly contingent on technological, economic, and
cultural conditions.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This study was primarily motivated by our inter-
est in understanding policy effects on organiza-
tions. Although previous studies have invoked an
image of policy as “powerful regardless,” we sug-
gest that policy is best understood as “contingent”
in the sense that its effects on organizations are
FIGURE 1
Bank Location Size and the Interaction between Branching Policy and Transportation Infrastructure
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FIGURE 2
Bank Location Size and the Interaction between Branching Policy and Business Competition
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likely to depend on the other environmental con-
ditions in which the organizations are embedded.
To investigate our thesis, we examined the
growth of U.S. commercial banking in the 20th
century. We argued and showed that this growth
entailed a trade-off between a centralized strategy
of establishing a few large units within a narrow
geographic area and a dispersed strategy of estab-
lishing a larger number of smaller units spanning a
wide geographic area. We further demonstrated
that (1) a policy allowing branching in a particular
state led banks in that state to pursue the dispersed
strategy and (2) this effect became stronger when
transportation technology (roadways in particular)
was more advanced in that state but became weaker
when interbank competition was intense or agrar-
ian presence was strong. The effects of a state’s
branching policy on banks’ pursuit of the central-
ized strategy were also highly contingent on that
state’s transportation technology, interbank com-
petition, and agrarian presence. Moreover, both
progress in transportation technology and in-
creased interbank competition discouraged banks
from pursuing the centralized strategy, but urban-
ization encouraged it. Together, these findings pro-
vide strong support for our arguments about bank
growth during the early 20th century. Building on
these findings, we now highlight some major im-
plications of this study.
Public Policy and Organizations
This study contributes to research on how policy
affects organizations, an important theme in organi-
zational theory. Previous studies have documented
that policy changes often have powerful effects on
organizations by creating fundamental shifts in the
external environment (e.g., Davis et al., 1994; Dobbin
& Dowd, 1997, 2000; Guthrie & Roth, 1999; Haveman
et al., 2001; Russo, 2001). Our results, though echoing
these studies, also suggest that they might overem-
phasize the effect of policy changes. This point is
important for organizational theory because these
prior studies may either misspecify or inaccurately
model the effects of policy. We showed that, although
the enactment of a state branching policy stimulated
banks to grow geographically, the effects of such a
policy also depended on its interaction with the
state’s technological development, economic condi-
tions, and underlying cultural features. Our results
lead us to conclude that the environments that organ-
izations face are complex and multifaceted and that a
given policy exerts a powerful impact only in the
presence of other, supporting factors. Future research
may want to focus on explicating the contingent ef-
fects of policy on organizational behaviors more
generally.
These contingent effects of policy on bank
growth in the United States are pictured vividly in
FIGURE 3
Bank Location Size and the Interaction between Branching Policy and Agrarian Presence
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Figure 4, which depicts relative bank size in three
states with dramatically different regulatory histo-
ries. Throughout the 20th century, North Carolina
permitted statewide branching, and Colorado pro-
hibited it; Alabama started as a unit-banking state
but initiated limited statewide banking in 1935.
The y-axis plots the z-score of total banking assets
for each state, which relates each state-year obser-
vation to the mean value of bank size in all 48
contiguous states for that year. Although North
Carolina allowed statewide branching, the relative
size of its banking industry did not surpass those of
Colorado and Alabama until the late 1910s, when
other environmental features, such as transporta-
tion technologies, had improved sufficiently to al-
low bank expansion. The state’s banks gradually
increased as transportation technology continued
to progress. This pattern suggests that the powerful
effect of liberal branching policy on bank growth
was not unleashed until other supportive environ-
mental conditions were available. Colorado, which
prohibited bank branching for the entire 20th cen-
tury, remained in the lower half of the distribution,
suggesting that its policy did indeed influence (that
is, impede) growth, even when other environmen-
tal factors advanced. Alabama’s banking growth
did not begin until after branching policy was lib-
eralized, at which point the state’s transportation
technologies were already advancing. In line with
our broader theoretical points, this suggests that the
standard perspective on how public policy impacts
bank growth (e.g., Stiroh & Strahan, 2003) may not
fully capture this process and that a contingent per-
spective on policy effects may be more accurate. The
comparison of these three states also suggests the
more general point that a contingent perspective is
particularly useful in understanding dynamics over
time and reinforces our assumption that certain se-
quences of external changes may have been respon-
sible for the patterns of large firms that we observe
today. That is, policy may be the necessary condition
for organizational growth, yet it is by no means suf-
ficient in and of itself to assure that growth.
The Growth of Large Organizations in the
20th Century
This study also has implications for debates on
how large-scale U.S. organizations emerged and de-
veloped (e.g., Chandler, 1977; Fligstein, 1990; Roy,
1997). First, as noted, prior explanations are largely
monocausal, giving prominence to only one set of
environmental conditions (policy, technology,
economy, or culture). We proposed instead an in-
tegrated approach to investigating how different
types of environmental conditions affected the
growth of large organizations independently and
interactively. Our findings largely confirm the
value of this approach by showing that the rise of
large-scale organizations to a dominant position in
U.S. society was a highly complex process unfold-
ing in multifaceted historical environments. The
value of our approach is not simply to pool these
different environmental conditions together but to
show how a contingent perspective on external en-
vironments and their influence on organizations
provides a more nuanced understanding of where,
when, and why large organizations grew.
FIGURE 4
Relative Size of Banks in Three States, 1896–1978
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These findings are also important more generally
because they address the significant tension under-
lying U.S. modernization processes. For example,
although dispersed retail outlets have become the
norm in the United States, there is still significant
local resistance to this dispersion (Marquis &
Lounsbury, 2007). Our findings track both sides of
this contentious process, the underlying mecha-
nisms that lead to centralization and dispersion,
and the features of society that resist the growth of
large-scale firms. This debate over centralized ver-
sus decentralized political and economic organiza-
tion has its roots in the core philosophical posi-
tions of the two major political parties present at
the founding of the United States. The Republicans,
led by Thomas Jefferson, preferred decentralized
political and economic systems with community-
oriented control of banks. The major opposing
party, the Federalists, led by Alexander Hamilton,
preferred centralized political and economic sys-
tems with large, multiple-branch, national banks.
Friedland and Alford noted that “the persistent
tendency for Americans to construct decentralized
state structures, to separate governmental powers, to
prevent the emergence of national banks . . . derives
in part from a culturally contingent concept of power,
embedded in a notion of liberty derived from the
original settlers’ experience of a highly intrusive En-
glish state” (1991: 246). This historical tension is un-
derexplored in examinations of how U.S. industries
evolved and are currently structured. Although na-
tionally oriented establishments, such as Wal-Mart
and Starbucks, have made extensive inroads in devel-
oping large chain organizations, they have also been
targets of the negative sentiments of community ac-
tors wanting to maintain local character and local
economic bases (Ingram & Rao, 2004). Our study
helps expose this fundamental tension; future re-
searchers may want to examine the recursive tension
between culture and public policy on this issue and
how it influences other industries.
Studying the growth of a service industry such as
banking contributes to understanding of the growth
of large-scale service organizations. In spite of the
dramatic increase in service firms in the second
half of the 20th century (Nohria, Dyer, & Daltzell,
2002), much of the theorizing about the growth of
large U.S. organizations has been about manufac-
turing firms. Our focus on the underlying mecha-
nisms and processes that enable or constrain
growth for service firms contributes to a fuller un-
derstanding of the rise of large organizations by
extending the focus beyond manufacturing firms.
Our findings from the banking industry can be gen-
eralized to a number of other major service indus-
tries. For example, hotel services, like banking ser-
vices, are characterized by the simultaneity of
production and distribution/consumption. As such,
they depend on the geographic distribution of cus-
tomers—usually travelers. Prior research suggests
that the growth strategy for hotels, and the devel-
opment of hotel chains and motels, also changed as
technical and legal environments developed in the
20th century (Gomes, 1985; Ingram, 1996; Seely,
1987). However, our theory and findings may not
be fully generalizable to all types of service firms, a
category that includes many industries with dis-
tinctive characteristics. For example, the mutual
fund industry is similar to banking in that it pro-
vides financial services, yet it is very different in
that its products are individually customized and
are created and managed by a centralized pool of
expert labor. As a result, the mutual fund industry
is centralized in locations (New York and Boston)
that have deep pools of professionals as well as
healthy markets for such products (e.g., Lounsbury,
2007). Similarly, the growth dynamics of service
industries that rely on professional labor, such as
law and accounting, are probably different from
those of banking (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006).
How large-scale organizations appeared in such
service industries may therefore warrant separate
consideration in future studies.
Implications for Policy Makers
The contingent effects of branching policy on
banks’ growth strategies suggest that when policy
makers attempt to influence a society and econ-
omy, they need to understand how technological,
economic, and cultural conditions might enable or
constrain their policies. This awareness suggests two
possible strategies in response. Policy makers could
divide their policy objectives into stages and begin by
implementing those portions of the policy that are
supported by existing conditions. Alternatively, pol-
icy makers could initially target their policy to spe-
cialized geographic areas with more supportive envi-
ronments. Both these approaches are exemplified by
the Chinese government’s economic reformation pol-
icy in the 1980s and 1990s, which gradually intro-
duced market principles to a planned economy
(Guthrie, 1999). The reforms were carried out in
phases and, early on, the Chinese created “special
economic zones”—such as Shenzhen, which borders
Hong Kong—to be areas of special reform.
Our analysis furthermore suggests a particular link
between technology and policy that is important for
policy makers, particularly those in emerging econo-
mies. Improvements to the technical infrastructure
might be necessary if certain policy measures are to
have their desired effects. Certainly many more tech-
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nological tools are available today than in the early
20th century, and the extent to which a given policy’s
effectiveness depends on technology in the contem-
porary economy is an open question. But the trans-
formative impact of modern technology, such as the
computer and the information technology that goes
with it, suggests that technology still constitutes an
important condition for the effectiveness of policy.
For example, although interstate bank growth follow-
ing 1978 is clearly the result of a significant policy
change, some have suggested that information tech-
nology advances also contributed significantly to that
growth (Kroszner & Strahan, 1999). This tension may
be particularly salient in emerging economies. For
example, despite the Indian government’s extensive
regulatory measures intended to encourage greater
rural coverage by banks, approximately 70 percent of
the rural population still lacks access to a local bank,
partly for lack of such technological infrastructure as
transportation (Timmons, 2007).
Prior research has shown how underlying cultural
factors impact policy and its effects (Dobbin, 1994);
our findings reveal how the deep interaction between
policy and culture may have practical implications as
well. For example, one implication of our results is
that policy makers should take underlying cultural
factors into account when anticipating the intended
effects of policy. Recent research has shown how
economic and social environments are highly com-
plex (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Lounsbury, 2007;
Scott, Ruef, Mendel, & Caronna, 2000) and thus,
though policy may reflect majority will, there may be
significant pockets of resistance or social movements
that condition the intended effects (Davis, McAdam,
Scott, & Zald, 2005; Schneiberg et al., 2008). Thus,
identifying the heterogeneous cultural beliefs and
their organization may be important when imple-
menting policy. For example, it is surprising that
lawmakers focused so extensively on the efficiency
aspects of bank consolidation when they passed the
Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Effi-
ciency Act in 1994. Ignoring the cultural dynamics
underlying local banking led to the irony that this act,
which had been designed to encourage large banks,
resulted in a flowering of smaller community banks
(Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007).
Although 1978—the beginning of interstate com-
petition in U.S. banking—was a natural breakpoint
for our analyses, a lingering question is the degree
to which the subsequent banking market reflected
the states’ varied historical backgrounds of policy,
technology, and economics. Anecdotal evidence,
such as the fact that North Carolina and Ohio are
headquarters states for large interstate chains, sug-
gests that the environmental trajectories of certain
states may have conferred advantages to their
banks. Similarly, other researchers have suggested
that understanding the disparate historical back-
grounds of firms and industries across nations can
provide traction on questions of global competi-
tiveness and might help explain how some firms
come to dominate global environments (North,
1990). Japan’s longtime emphasis on state sponsor-
ship led to international success in the automotive
and electronics industries, while Germany came to
dominate the synthetic dye industry as a result of the
lack of patent controls relative to Britain and France
(Murmann, 2003). A more recent example is a debate
within the European Union about the status of com-
panies and industries that previously enjoyed signif-
icant state support (Economist, 2004; Theil, 2004),
suggesting that these firms have advantages attribut-
able to their historical backgrounds. Thus, a further
implication—extending our findings to a more gen-
eral level and suggesting some contemporary impli-
cations—is that the histories of firms’ external envi-
ronments may be essential to understanding their
current structure and success.
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APPENDIX
Assembling Data on Historical Intrastate
Banking Laws
Historical data on intrastate banking regulations for the
48 contiguous U.S. states were collected from numerous
sources. A survey by the Comptroller of the Currency, re-
ported in Chapman and Westerfield (1942), contains infor-
mation on branching regulations in 1896. We used this
survey, cited by a number of sources as the first survey of
branch banking in the United States, as our starting point in
compiling histories of bank laws. For this early period, we
also examined the Digest of State Banking Statutes com-
piled in 1910 by Welldon. Bradford’s (1940) The Legal
Status of Branching in the United States contains data from
a periodic publication of the Federal Reserve for the years
1910, 1924, 1929, 1932, 1936, and 1939. We also collected
data from the Federal Reserve publication, “State Laws
Relating to Branch Banking” (Federal Reserve Bulletin,
March 1925, April 1930, July 1932, November 1936, Octo-
ber 1939, July 1951). Fischer’s (1968: 62–63) state-by-state
breakdown of intrastate banking and regulations between
1924 and 1967 documents the years of legal change. The
Federal Reserve’s Compilation of Federal and State Stat-
utes Relating to Branch Banking, published in December
1956 and October 1967, contains the statutes at those times.
For the period after 1967, we used A Profile of State-Char-
tered Banking (various years), published biannually by the
Conference of State Bank Supervisors. Berger, Kashyap,
and Scalise (1995) summarized laws since 1960, and Han-
nan and Prager’s (1998) “The Relaxation of Entry Barriers in
the Banking Industry: An Empirical Investigation” reports
data from 1986 to 1994. For some of the earlier years for
which we had to make assumptions about branching regu-
lations, we relied on Fischer (1968), who maintains that
regulation during this period was in many cases by custom
rather than law. We followed his assessment of the type of
branching enforced in a given state. For the few cases for
which we did not have branch-law information for a par-
ticular year, we assumed the legal history to be continuous
(e.g., if we had information that Illinois was a unit-banking
state in 1911 and 1915, we assumed it to be a unit-banking
state from 1912 to 1914).
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